This morning, I recommend downloading and reading Sara Goldrick-Rab’s review of the Brookings Institute Chingos/Peterson study of vouchers’ effects on college attendance. Bottom line (from p. 7):
Policymakers and practitioners interested in the effectiveness of school voucher programs should indeed attend to the results of this study, which—contrary to the interpretation of the authors—convincingly demonstrates that in New York City a private voucher program failed to increase the college enrollment rates of students from low-income families.
Update (9/29/12): The link above also has Chingos and Peterson’s response and Goldrick-Rab’s rebuttal. One of the questions between them is about the focus on African-Americans as a subgroup without highlighting the non-significance of the overall effect (0.6% increase in college enrollment for those offered vouchers, where the standard error of that estimate is 2.2%). If you look just at the sample from the study, the non-African-American sample has to have decreased college attendance by 4.1%, but what is the standard error (i.e., can we be reasonably certain that if the increase for African-Americans is statistically significant, then is the decrease for everyone else also statistically significant)? I decided to simulate a batch of 1000 samples that each had a subgroup consisting of 42% exposed to a random effect of 7.1% increased college attendance (3.4% standard error) and where the total sample was exposed to a random effect of 0.6% increased college attendance (2.2% standard error), and where the total sample and the 42% subsample effects varied normally. Bottom line: a simulated median and mean decrease of the low 4% range in college attendance for the 58% of the simulated samples whose effects were inferred. Depending on the random seed for the simulation, between 80 and 82% of the simulations have negative effects, and the 95th percentile effect was about 3.3%. This makes sense if you think about the sample: if a minority of a population has strong effects in one direction, and the overall effect is zero, the remainder would have weaker effects in the other direction (and here I mean strong and weak in both the effect’s magnitude and the probabilistic sense of not likely to be zero).
Is it likely that the college-matriculating effect of offering vouchers to African American families is clearly positive but a weaker negative effect for everyone else? Having thought about this study for over a month, I can’t think of the relevant mechanisms that would give you that result.
Further update (12/25): I am trying to learn a little R while running through John Kruschke’s text on Bayesian stats (impression thus far: very good), so here’s a little code if you want to run this yourself. ((I apologize for the lack of indentation; I couldn’t figure out how to do that within HTML’s code tags.))
# Specify known values from study data
muT = 0.006 # effect for total population
sigmaT = 0.022 # effect estimation standard deviation
muAA = 0.071 # effect for African American participants
sigmaAA = 0.034 #effect estimation standard deviation for African Americans
mixPropAA = 0.42 # proportion of study participants who were African American
#
# Simulation
#
# Designate an arbitrarily large number of simulated samples.
nSimSamples = 10000
# Set aside correctly-sized vectors in which to store the simulation results.
simSampleTrecord = vector( length=nSimSamples ) # total effect
simSampleAArecord = vector( length=nSimSamples ) # African American effect
simSampleNBrecord = vector( length=nSimSamples ) # effect for non-African Americans
#
# Generating MC "sample" estimates from the study results.
# sampleIdx is an index .
for ( sampleIdx in 1:nSimSamples ) {
# Generate an effect value for the simulated sample from the study results.
sampleDiffTotal = rnorm( 1 , muT , sigmaT )
sampleDiffAA = rnorm (1, muAA, sigmaAA)
# Generate an effect for non-African Americans.
sampleDiffNB = (sampleDiffTotal - sampleDiffAA * mixPropAA)/ (1-mixPropAA)
# Store the sample data in the vectors created above.
simSampleTrecord[ sampleIdx ] = sampleDiffTotal
simSampleAArecord[ sampleIdx ] = sampleDiffAA
simSampleNBrecord[ sampleIdx ] = sampleDiffNB
}
# Make a histogram for each variable of interest.
hist( simSampleTrecord )
hist( simSampleAArecord )
hist( simSampleNBrecord )
# Summary stats
summary( simSampleTrecord )
summary( simSampleAArecord )
summary( simSampleNBrecord )
Way into the weeds: I’m using a normal distribution for effects, which may or may not be the best choice in theory–attending/not-attending college is a dichotomous variable, and a few other options might work better. I suspect the gist of these results would stay the same with a different choice of distribution: if a minority of a population has strong effects in one direction, and the overall effect is zero, the remainder would have weaker effects in the other direction.
Even further into the weeds: Another approach would be to generate a very large simulated sample through a two-step process: first simulating a set of sample parameters, and then drawing a simulated individual outcome based on the sample mean for each simulated sample. This would require a distribution choices for individual outcomes, not just sample parameters.
Update (1/7/2015): The research now has appeared in the Journal of Public Economics.
The quoted statement betrays a serious misunderstanding of what significance testing is.
Stuart,
I suppose a more accurate statement would be something like, “A frequentist interpretation of the data in the Chingos-Peterson paper (assuming randomness and a few other technical details) would leave one fairly confident that the effect of the program on initial college enrollment is somewhere between a few percentage points depressed and a few percentage points increased; a Bayesian interpretation of the data would require a strong prior of increased enrollment to result in a post conclusion of increased enrollment.” At this point, the policymaker would be falling asleep.
Update for readers: the link above to NEPC includes Chingos and Peterson’s reply to the review and Goldrick-Rab’s response to their reply.
Well, it’s not a mere technicality that can be rectified through rephrasing. It’s a flat-out fallacy to suggest that a lack of statistical significance “convincingly demonstrates” that the null hypothesis is true.
By analogy, here’s how significant testing works:
On the assumption that there’s no fire, it would be unlikely to see smoke.
But I do see smoke.
This makes it reasonable to reject the null hypothesis that there’s no fire.
Or in a case of failing to find significance:
On the assumption that there’s no fire, it would be unlikely to see smoke.
I don’t see smoke.
Therefore, I can’t confidently say that there is a fire.
But what she did was this, and it’s wrong:
On the assumption that there’s no fire, it would be unlikely to see smoke.
I don’t see smoke.
Therefore, I have convincingly disproven that there’s a fire.
No. Your failure to see smoke might be because there’s no fire, yes, but it also might be because your eyesight is poor, or you’re looking in the wrong direction, or the wind is dispersing the smoke before you see it, or the fire is too small to see at the moment.
Similarly, there are reasons that one might fail to find an overall statistically significant impact here (statistical power, measurement error in the independent variables, heterogeneity of impact).
To be sure, lots of social scientists make elementary errors in this area. See http://blogs.hbr.org/fox/2012/06/economists-are-overconfident-s.html
Here along the Gulf of Mexico we *always* use the hurricane “cone” projections — that are just like the Bank of England “fan” projections — because of the unpredictable path that hurricanes take. Thanks for the heads up.
The Soyer/Hogarth paper was also illuminating — “presentation formats lead to misinterpretation” — but bigger problems with “statistical significance often wrongly associated with replicability” — that a new sample will produce the same results (isn’t this what we call validity?).
9-25-12 WSJ ran a bk review of a similar critique, “numbers do not speak for themselves,” and must be contextualized. This is where decision makers get into trouble — re-contextualizing numbers, giving them new meaning.